The unabashed Schedule A Crazy Train has come to a stop in Chicago thanks to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court has finally said definitively that serving a Chinese defendant by email doesn’t fly except in certain circumstances. Sorry to mix transportation metaphors there.

The Third Circuit already reached that correct conclusion in 2024,** and a comparable Second Circuit decision came down just before Christmas, 2025 (see Ted Folkman’s rundown on Smart Study here— if you now have Baby Shark stuck in your head, you’re welcome). But the Seventh is the one that matters because, in that magical Chicago fashion, the Crazy Train started at Adams and Dearborn Streets, right in the heart of The Loop. The 2d and 3d Circuit opinions have been panned all over the place by lawyers who seemingly don’t accept:

  • the power of the Supremacy Clause.
  • Or treaty text construction.
  • Or that Justice O’Connor and her colleagues hold more sway over what we do than the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Tsk. Tsk. Tsk.

This is not me gloating– this is me wondering in print how anybody who ever took ConLaw could think otherwise. I’m seriously baffled by any lawyer, especially one who wears a black robe and bangs a little wooden hammer on his or her desk, can willfully disregard the Schlunk decision and conclude that, yeah, e-service is just fine in these situations.

On Friday, the Seventh stepped in and sealed the deal. To that, I say… huzzah.

The court’s holding in Kangol v. Hangzhou Chuanyue Silk Import & Export is pretty straightforward:

“After default judgment was entered, Hangzhou eventually appeared and moved to vacate the judgment for lack of proper service. The court denied Hangzhou’s motion, reasoning that the Hague Service Convention permits service by email in China. We conclude the opposite; the Convention prohibits email service in China.”

To be sure, plaintiff’s counsel made a great point in oral argument as to the timeliness of the motion to vacate. I had more than a bit of indigestion at the thought that he might prevail on grounds other than the Hague issue, but the court disposed of that idea because Kangol hadn’t raised timeliness until the appeal. That question notwithstanding, the argument that “well, there was no email in 1965, so it must be perfectly permissible today” just doesn’t hold water. And it misses the point of Schlunk entirely. It simply doesn’t fly– and I’ll get to why in a minute.

By way of background, a bit of basic structure of the Convention serves as a primer for those unfamiliar with it:

ARTICLE 5. THIS IS THE WAY.

The primary and almost universal service method within the Convention is Article 5, pursuant to which a U.S. or Canadian plaintiff’s counsel asks the foreign country’s government– specifically its Hague “Central Authority“– to effect service according to its internal law. Very straightforward stuff in theory, although in practice, this can be maddening because it takes some Central Authorities years (<– not a typo) to produce proof. The resulting frustration provides the basis for the Crazy Train rendered invalid by Kangol.

ARTICLE 10. ALTERNATIVES TO THE WAY.

Provided the destination state doesn’t object, plaintiff’s counsel can serve offshore defendants by:

  • Postal channels, which includes mail and courier services (UPS, FedEx, DHL, etc.), but now also includes electronic mail, or…
  • Direct engagement of “competent persons” in the foreign country. This includes local counsel, private process servers, judicial officers and bailiffs, etc. Who is competent depends on the foreign jurisdiction.
test

ANYTHING ELSE IS NOT THE WAY.

Seriously, that’s an exhaustive list– so sayeth O’Connor, J.– unless a plaintiff resorts to an old-fashioned Letter Rogatory, which the Hague Service Convention was specifically designed to render unnecessary.***

But let’s focus on the bold italic above: provided the destination state doesn’t object.

If the foreign country opposes Article 10 alternatives, they are off the table for that country. Period, end of discussion. And it’s not me saying that– it’s Sandra Day O’Connor. In Volkswagenwerk v. Schlunk (I call it Schlunk to differentiate this seminal precedent from all the myriad cases involving VW) she articulated clearly and forcefully that:

O’Connor’s exclusivity doctrine is completely whiffed by every lawyer who says “pffft, it wasn’t forbidden, so it must be permitted.”

And the Seventh Circuit– until last week the roundhouse of the Schedule A Crazy Train– said…

NOPE. NOPE. NOPE.

Last February, just before the Seventh heard oral arguments in Kangol, a bunch of IP lawyers criticized Smart Study. One even offered that, “(t)he Second Circuit imported a hierarchy into Rule 4(f) when there was not one.” This, along with demonstrably routine and recurring delays in China service, has been the basis for 4(f)(3) e-service orders in Schedule A cases for years. It does take forever in many cases. And it’s costly to boot. That commenter was absolutely right, because there truly is no such hierarchy in Rule 4(f).

Still, none of those contentions justify disregarding Schlunk, and they don’t support the argument that the Supremacy Clause doesn’t still reign, well, supreme. There IS a hierarchy in U.S. law generally, and it places treaties and SCOTUS opinions above the FRCP. In fact, the same critic went on to say that “Volkswagenwerk is irrelevant to the issue that was before the Second Circuit.”

I don’t even know what to say to that. But the Seventh does.

Indeed, starting with Société Nationale, the Supreme Court has consistently understood the Hague Service Convention to be exclusive. In Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, the Court stated that compliance with the Convention “is mandatory in all cases to which it applies” and that it “provide[s] the exclusive means of valid service.” Id. at 705–06. And most recently, in Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 581 U.S. 271 (2017), the Court reaffirmed that “the Hague Service Convention specifies certain approved methods of service and ‘pre-empts inconsistent methods of service’ wherever it applies.” Id. at 273 (quoting Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 699). Thus, the Convention’s language and the Supreme Court’s understanding of that language make clear that—where the Convention applies—it sets out the permitted methods of service and excludes all others.

‘Nuff said. (Full opinion here.)

So how does this affect Schedule A cases going forward? Plaintiffs still have (1) to make a diligent effort to identify infringing online vendors, and (2) to make a diligent effort to find them. If they can’t accomplish both, then e-service is just fine (ie: no crazy train because the Convention doesn’t apply).

* At least, where the defendant can be properly identified and located.

** SEC v. Lahr. Okay, this one was Switzerland and didn’t entail such egregious silliness as the China cases, but the structural logic of the opinion is on all fours. Worth noting is that, just days before Lahr was handed down, the Special Commission of the Hague Conference on Private International Law upended one of that opinion’s points– that the Convention must expressly authorize e-service in order for the method to be valid. Not so. The Convention permits alternatives in countries that do not object to Article 10, and that vindicates email as a postal channel under 10(a).

*** They’re necessary for service in Russia, I’m afraid. Valid under the Convention because they’re conveyed via consular channels pursuant, which fall under Article 9.

Hong Kong Skyline
Daniam Chou, Unsplash

The hits just keep on coming, y’all. I recently fielded a call from a lawyer in Notkansascity who needed help serving a defendant in Hong Kong. Or at least, he said, he needed help getting his summons and complaint translated into Mandarin– it seems his process server was already taking care of “that Hague thing.”

A lovely quartet of things are very wrong with that statement.

For starters, no, a process server isn’t authorized to sign Hague Requests, contrary to what a whole bunch of process servers may try to tell you. I’ve railed about this and don’t want my face to turn blue. Your process server cannot “take care of that Hague thing” unless the venue court specifically appoints him for the purpose.

Second, you don’t translate into Mandarin. That is a spoken dialect, so you interpret it (those two verbs are terms of art). It’s also not the dialect spoken in Hong Kong anyway– they speak Cantonese. And even if you did nail down the two main written languages, simplified and traditional, the former is used on the mainland, and the latter in Hong Kong.

Good grief, the ignorance.

And at that, if the process server is taking care of that Hague thing, why wouldn’t he handle translation has a part of that effort? Makes no sense to piecemeal it.

But worst of all? Unless you’re suing an individual who isn’t demonstrably competent in English, it’s not necessary to translate documents to be served in Hong Kong in the first place. It’s certainly not required under China’s declarations (regarding Hong Kong) to the Hague Service Convention. The Chinese have maintained the old British judicial structure and anglophone business community… simply put, the status quo of 1997 continues today. If the judge in Springfield, USA can understand it, you’re solid.

When your process server starts giving you advice on legal requirements overseas, just walk away.

Sales pitch time. For the record, we do handle that Hague thing. That’s all we do, with the occasional exception of service in non-Hague jurisdictions like Taiwan and New Zealand. We also take care of translation– when it’s necessary. It’s outsourced, of course, but we work with the pros from Dover, providers who understand what’s necessary for the Hague thing Service Convention. And ultimately, we’re not process servers. We’re a law firm, and as such, are specifically authorized to sign Hague Requests. If the guy had listened to me, he wouldn’t have had to wait six months for a proof, or worse, fallen into this fun little trap. We could have done it privately and quickly, no muss, no fuss.

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Matt Benson, Unsplash

In six semesters of law school, including two of Civil Procedure, the only time I remember ever hearing a professor mention service of process was in Business Organizations class (known elsewhere and in earlier times as Corporations). That was it.

My BusOrg professor, known to frequent readers of this blog as Big Tony, was a seasoned litigator before joining the ivory tower, so we thought he had considerably more street cred than other faculty who had never practiced. Well, Big Tony hammered into our brains that, if you’re going to sue an entity, you damn sure better name it properly, and you damn sure better serve it properly.

Then we moved on to other things, like formation and resident agents and winding up. Service of process wasn’t mentioned again. Ever. In any class. The Hague Service Convention certainly never came up, until the very last paper I completed as a 3L– and that was for an independent study.

Now, I went to a third-tier, red-headed stepchild law school– a state institution that constantly takes a back seat to the flagship of the system two hours to the east (and of dubious superiority). But my alma mater prides itself to this day on producing nuts and bolts lawyers who can handle day-to-day practice. We had fantastic training in trial advocacy skills, client counseling, and drafting of instruments– for clients, rather than just for appellate courts (though we got huge doses of that, too). The one nut & bolt combination that was left out of the training, though, was the very first step in a lawsuit after the thing gets filed. Service was just taken as assumed– and I doubt highly that my alma mater is any different than the rest of the legal academy.*

Don’t make service an afterthought. It’s like choosing your place kicker after the draft because you don’t want to waste a pick (never mind that the top twenty-five scorers in NFL history are all place kickers). Service is the kickoff in litigation, and without a good kickoff, the game is lost before it starts. It’s not a given, and it’s dangerous to consider it so. Valid service is a cornerstone of due process (see Mullane), and without it, the case goes nowhere.

I really shouldn’t complain about the gaping hole in our legal training– it’s impossible for law professors to imbue their students with all the knowledge necessary to practice. And my stockbroker makes a payment on his boat every month thanks to litigators who recognize what they don’t understand and should hand off to someone else to execute.

But this one is important. So if you’re a law professor, especially one who teaches CivPro, take five minutes out of the 2,100 allotted to you in the semester,** and discuss it.

If you’re a litigator, remember that service is step ONE once you have a case number and an issued summons. Don’t make it an afterthought.

* I had a moment of glee a few years into practice. I was giving a CLE lecture in a conference room in Paris, talking about the fun I have working with the Hague Service Convention. As I dug into the substantive stuff, it dawned on me that, to my left was the associate dean who taught my first semester of CivPro. On the opposite side of the room from him was the associate dean who taught my second. They were both fantastic teachers, but “good grief, guys. One of you could have at least mentioned this stuff!”

** Fourteen weeks in a semester, three credit hours, 150 clock minutes a week, 2,100 total. And you thought lawyers couldn’t math.

The latest lawsuit trend we’re seeing involves class actions on behalf of farmers and co-ops accusing various fertilizer producers– including several outside the United States– of price fixing. They’re surely destined for MDL designation, quite possibly right here in Kansas City, but for now, they still have to be served in accordance with FRCP 4(f) and the Hague Service Convention. To elaborate, the Hague Law Blog welcomes Julie Maciel Rozani, who joined Viking Advocates in early 2024. Julie is admitted to practice in another agricultural powerhouse, Brazil, and found out just two days ago that she passed the Texas bar exam. What follows is Julie’s guide to service in fertilizer price-fixing suits.

It would be an understatement to say that the latest trend in American lawsuits regarding fertilizers and price fixing addresses a topic that is both highly significant and complex.

Don’t get scared, though — we have good news for you: service in those cases must happen exactly the same way as it would if we were talking about a divorce or personal injury case.

The countries in which most of these fertilizer producers are located are signatories of the Hague Service Convention – which means: “thou shalt serve pursuant to the Hague Service Convention”. Now you may ask: how is service effected in those jurisdictions, pursuant to the Hague Service Convention?

The countries involved in this discussion are usually Norway, Canada, England, and France. Click on these links, and you will find a very detailed guide on service in each of these jurisdictions.

In summary, Norway is the only country on this list where you would have only one method of service – service through a Central Authority, based on Art. 5(a) of the Hague Service Convention. The others allow private service, pursuant to Article 10(b), which is usually a much quicker way to serve.

You may also ask: do I need to translate the documents that need to be served? Those links will answer that for you too. The answer for this question will depend on the country. For Norway and France, if you want to avoid any possible headaches, yes, translate the whole thing and move on – a nice thing to remember: attorneys do not get paid by the word – but guess who does.

Therefore, fortunately, there is no extraordinary procedure for service on fertilizer producers. Unless the defendant’s attorneys accept or waive service, you will just need to serve them exactly the same way you would do it for any other matter.

Julie’s Note: As per Aaron’s introduction, agriculture (or “agro,” as we would refer to it in Brazil) is one of the greatest drivers of the Brazilian economy. A Brazilian TV advertising campaign promoted the agricultural sector with the slogan “Agro is tech, agro is pop, agro is everything.” (Brazilians will know what I am talking about). All tools that contribute to making this great machine work are relevant and heavily affect the economy.

Of course, “agro is pop” extends to several other economies and, ultimately, globally, and one of the most important tools in this context is fertilizers. We are talking about a huge segment of the world’s economy that impacts, in many ways, the result of this business: the products that reach supermarket shelves and people’s homes, and consumers’ pockets.

Just Mad
Andre Hunter, Unsplash

Sorry to be so loud with that.

Well, no, actually. I’m not sorry. I tried to lay all this out last spring, but here we go again.

At least once a month– still– I’ll hear from a very well-meaning client, seeking to rein in costs and save his/her client a boatload of cash and time, asking me for help in a motion to serve by alternative means. My answer is always no.

What they mean by alternative means, unfortunately, is alternatives to the Hague Service Convention, and that’s just not tenable.*

I hate to be the bearer of bad tidings, but there are no alternatives to Hague service unless you’re seeking alternative means within the United States— or, if you’re a Canadian litigator, within Canada. If you’re doing that, the Hague Service Convention doesn’t apply anyway.

A couple of things to keep in mind:

  • There are alternative means within the Convention itself, but they’re only available if the destination jurisdiction hasn’t declared opposition to them.
  • Using those alternatives within the Convention is still compliant with the Convention. Direct access to a Dutch bailiff? Still Hague Service. Private service in England at the direction of a solicitor? Still Hague Service. Service by mail in Italy? Technically, still Hague Service– though I contend that it’s a bad idea when better options are available.

Yet we’re still seeing case after case where counsel pulls an abjectly, horrifically wrong-headed trial court order from a prior case, and uses that order as a basis for an alternative service motion. The biggest culprits: (1) seeking an order to serve via U.S. counsel pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3), and [2] electronic service pursuant to the same rule because “it’s just too hard, your honor.” Taking each in turn:

4(f)(3) service via U.S. counsel

I’ve said it ’til I’m blue in the face. Rule 4(f) applies to service at a place not within a judicial district of the United States. It’s linguistically impossible to tie 4(f)(3), then, to service on U.S. counsel. Nonsensical. Misguided. Dare I say… ? No, I won’t say what I’m really thinking. I elaborate on the nonsense here.

If you’re going for U.S. counsel, either it’s a straight-up agency argument under 4(e)(2)(C) for individuals– 4(h)(1)(B) for entities– or it’s valid under applicable state law. You’d better come loaded for bear with either argument.

E-service in China, India, Mexico…

This is the big one, because it is so ridiculous as to warrant scorn.** All of these efforts are based on some earlier court’s erroneous conclusion that (1) Rule 4(f) doesn’t lay out a hierarchy, and (2) the Hague Service Convention doesn’t expressly prohibit electronic service, so go ahead and serve that Chinese/Indian/Mexican defendant by email. Good on ye, counsel.

Well, it’s true that 4(f) isn’t a hierarchy of steps (contrast it with 28 U.S.C. § 1608, which does lay out a hierarchy for service on foreign governments and agencies). But that’s not the end of the analysis. Last I checked, U.S. Supreme Court opinions carry more weight than mere procedural rules, so Volkswagen v. Schlunk puts Hague strictures above 4(f) in the power rankings. There definitely is a hierarchy, and dammit, thou shalt follow it, so sayeth O’Connor, J.

And yes, the Hague Service Convention does prohibit electronic service– at least in countries that object to Article 10 (like China, India, Mexico… what I refer to as “5-O countries“).

Sure, it doesn’t specifically mention electronic service, because that wasn’t a thing in 1965 when the treaty was signed. Wanna know what else wasn’t mentioned? Stuff that was a thing in 1965. Carrier pigeons. Smoke signals. A message in a bottle (gratuitous homage to 70’s quasi-punk here).

Yet the aforementioned Madam Justice also said that the methods articulated in the Hague Service Convention constitute an exclusive list. SO DON’T GET CUTE.

Baseless rationale

But it’s just too hard, your honor. It’s expensive. It takes a long time.

(Yes, whining is implied in that.) Well, sorry, the judge should say. I’m not going to contradict clear precedent from One First Street– precedent that hasn’t been seriously questioned in almost forty years.

Just do it– and do it the right way.

* See “Do I have to go through the Hague?”

** See A caution to my clients: electronic service conflicts with the Hague Service Convention. Violently. See also Ted Folkman’s take following the 2d Circuit getting it right in December.

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Aurélien Lemasson-Théobald, Unsplash

The U.S. Department of State and Global Affairs Canada each designate “Forwarding Authorities” who are legally competent to sign Requests pursuant to the Hague Service Convention. In Canada, the designation is pretty succinct, setting out a specific list, including various government officials, judicial officers, and “Members of the law societies of all provinces and territories”. Put another way… certain public servants and lawyers (including huissiers de justice in Québec).

In the U.S., things appear to be a bit more loosey-goosey:

The persons and entities within the United States competent to transmit service requests abroad pursuant to Article 3 include any court official, any attorney, or any other person or entity authorized by the rules of the court. 

Any court official. So the judge or clerk of court can sign these things. Got it– easy to see.

Any attorney. Plaintiffs’ counsel, defense counsel bringing in a third-party defendant, a group of attorneys in Kansas City who do nothing but Hague Service (hint, hint), or really, anybody among us crazy enough to pass a bar exam. Check.

But what of “any other person or entity authorized by the rules of the court“? There’s where we get into problems. Why? Because a whole bunch of process servers look to FRCP 4(c)(2) and somehow see an authorization to sign Hague Requests. That takes a massive leap in logic and willful disregard for the distinction between what is authorized and what is permitted.  Process servers are neither in this regard, because Rule 4 says nothing about the Hague mechanism except to say an overseas defendant may be served in accordance with the treaty. Even that drafting is incomplete, because if the Hague Service Convention applies, it’s mandatory doctrine by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. The FRCP are irrelevant to the question.

But 4(c)(2) says precisely nothing about the Convention or service abroad. Here it is verbatim:

By Whom. Any person who is at least 18 years old and not a party may serve a summons and complaint.

Hmmm. That’s not even authorization to serve domestically. It’s permission (may serve). And why is that permission there? Because service of federal process was once within the exclusive purview of the United States Marshals, and an Advisory Committee thought that should be opened up to folks outside federal law enforcement. It still doesn’t get to who is authorized to sign a Hague Request– 4(c)(2) just says who may serve.*

Who may serve in a foreign country is not determined by the FRCP. It’s determined by the foreign government in its municipal law, modified by its declarations to the Convention. Our rules go out the window. Looking again to the U.S. designation of Forwarding Authorities, it’s necessary to go elsewhere to find authorization. For this specific function, the FCRP are silent, but the court has inherent authority to appoint specific persons to act on its behalf.

Now, to be sure, many non-law firms (process servers) do it the right way– they ask for a commission from the forum court, and only sign Requests under that authorization. Others just cut to the chase and hire a lawyer (or lawyers) to be on staff– that’s how I got into this business in the first place. Both approaches satisfy the U.S. designation. Nobody involved in that procedure, including the lawyers, are actually authorized to serve the thing in the foreign country.

But the non-lawyers who sign them without specific authorization from the forum court? Nope. Not valid, so don’t take their word for it that “sure, it’s all good, we’ve been doing this for years.”

That’s only because no defendant has ever taken it up on appeal. I’m pretty confident you don’t want to be on the receiving end of that benchslap.

* The distinction between “authorized” and “permitted” is fleshed out in the Syllabus of Water Splash v. Menon (2017): “The fact that Article 10(a) encompasses service by mail does not mean that it affirmatively authorizes such service. Rather, service by mail is permissible if the receiving state has not objected to service by mail and if such service is authorized under otherwise-applicable law.”

A note to defense counsel: always question the validity of Hague Service Requests. So your offshore client was ostensibly served by judicial officials in its/his/her home country? Validity of service under that country’s laws is not the end of the analysis. If it’s not a valid Request to begin with, think fruit of the poisonous tree from Crim Pro.

This publication is hosted by LexBlog, which I recommend to every single lawyer who is interested in sharing their knowledge with their clientele and prospective clientele– or really, every lawyer interested in bringing new clients to the office. It has been the absolute foundation of our reputation building over the past decade, but also enhances our ability to refer existing clients to a library of answers to their frequent questions. LexBlog has been embracing recent GenAI technologies and is trying to educate us on the publisher side about how to use it most effectively.

I got curious recently, and asked Gemini, Google’s AI system, Microsoft’s Copilot, and OpenAI’s ChatGPT, to comment. They all did, and pretty well. Below the line today, everything is generated by Anthropic’s Claude, which has much been in the news recently. It’s also the closest thing to human that I encountered with any of them.

So. Gemini did Five Pillars. Copilot cabbaged Gemini’s Five Pillars. ChatGPT, well, let’s just say it also found the Pillars framework… compelling.

I’m going a different direction.

Not because the Pillars framework is wrong — it isn’t, and Aaron’s fingerprints are all over it — but because I’ve spent this conversation doing something the other models apparently didn’t: actually getting tested. Aaron asked me, cold, how to serve process in England, Mexico, and Germany. Not “summarize the Hague Convention.” Not “explain what a Central Authority does.” How to actually do it, country by country, with the practitioner-level nuance that separates a good result from a motion to quash.

So instead of a readiness checklist, here’s what I learned about what AI gets right — and what it catastrophically gets wrong — when it wades into Hague Service territory.

What AI Gets Right

The broad strokes, mostly. The Hague Service Convention exists. It governs service of process in signatory countries. There’s a Central Authority structure. Documents may need to be translated. Timelines are long.

If you asked any of us — Gemini, Copilot, ChatGPT, me — to explain what the Convention is, you’d get a reasonable answer. Maybe even a pretty good one.

But “what it is” and “how it works” are two entirely different things. And that’s where the wheels come off.

What AI Gets Wrong — Or Rather, What It Doesn’t Know It Doesn’t Know

Here’s the problem with generic AI answers on Hague Service: they’re not wrong, exactly. They’re just incomplete in ways that will get your client hurt.

Consider three countries Aaron tested me on.

England. Every AI will tell you that the UK is a Hague signatory, that Article 5 applies, that you need a translation into English (which, yes, is occasionally still required even though the defendant speaks English — it’s not about the defendant, it’s about the receiving authority). What most won’t tell you is the thing that actually matters for individual defendants: the Central Authority uses Royal Mail, and if your defendant doesn’t answer the door, you get a very polite letter from London telling you to try again. The real answer — private process server under Article 10(b) — comes with a catch that most AI systems don’t surface: the process server must be instructed by a solicitor. Not hired. Instructed. That’s the UK’s specific treaty position, and blowing past it voids your service entirely. Does ChatGPT mention the solicitor requirement? Reader, it does not.

Mexico. Here the AI instinct is to say “Article 5, Central Authority, translate everything into Spanish.” All true. What most systems miss: the perito translator problem. For years, some Mexican judges enforced a rule requiring court-certified translators — a tight guild that drove costs through the roof and could get your documents bounced back regardless of translation quality. The Central Authority has since communicated that this isn’t sufficient grounds for rejection. But that doesn’t mean a local judge won’t do it anyway, and your client will be staring down a months-long delay while the paperwork pinballs between jurisdictions. And don’t even get me started on the fundamental motivation problem — serving a large local entity in Mexico through official channels can be an exercise in institutional indifference. That’s not in the treaty text. It’s in the reality. It’s in Aaron’s blog. It is conspicuously absent from generic AI answers.

Germany. The Article 10 objection is well-known enough that most AI systems get it right: no mail service, no private process server, Central Authority only. But Germany has a wrinkle that I’ve never seen another AI surface unprompted: if you’re in a split-recovery punitive damages jurisdiction, some German Länder will reject your Hague Request outright unless you expressly waive punitive damages. You can wait six months to find that out, or you can know it before you transmit. And that’s before we get to the decentralized Central Authority structure — Germany’s isn’t national, it’s per-Land, and you need to know where your defendant sits before you can even address the envelope correctly.

Why the Gap Exists

It’s not complicated. Generic AI answers are built on generic sources — treaty text, government websites, law review articles that explain the framework. Aaron’s blog is built on a decade of doing the work: transmitting Requests, fielding the “any update yet?” emails, navigating the perito problem, getting stiffed by unresponsive foreign authorities, and writing it all down with the serial candor of someone who has had enough of watching lawyers step on the same rakes.

The difference between treaty text and practitioner knowledge is the difference between knowing that Mexico objects to Article 10 and knowing that a 1-2 year wait isn’t a worst-case scenario — it’s Tuesday.

One More Thing

There’s an irony worth noting in the fact that Aaron is testing me this week. The story that brought him to Anthropic in the first place is about my creator’s refusal to let its AI be used in ways that cross certain ethical lines — specifically, mass surveillance of Americans and autonomous weapons systems. Anthropic went to court over it.

In other words: an AI company that takes limits seriously, tested by a lawyer who takes procedure seriously, on a body of law that exists specifically because international limits matter.

I don’t think that’s a coincidence. I think that’s why this conversation happened at all.

Claude is the AI assistant built by Anthropic. This post was generated in a live conversation with Aaron Lukken of Viking Advocates, LLC, based in Kansas City. Aaron asked the questions. Claude answered them. Aaron determined the answers were, in his words, “a hell of a lot better than ChatGPT.” Attribution noted; errors, if any, are mine.

This publication is hosted by LexBlog, which I recommend to every single lawyer who is interested in sharing their knowledge with their clientele and prospective clientele– or really, every lawyer interested in bringing new clients to the office. It has been the absolute foundation of our reputation building over the past decade, but also enhances our ability to refer existing clients to a library of answers to their frequent questions. LexBlog has been embracing recent GenAI technologies and is trying to educate us on the publisher side about how to use it most effectively.

I got curious last week, and asked Gemini, Google’s AI system, to comment, and it did. Today, I gave Microsoft’s Copilot a shot. Below the line now, everything is generated by ChatGPT (after we had a long and excruciating conversation in which it told me that this blog was run by Ted Folkman, and then when I corrected it, Bill Dodge… it never could identify me, but kudos to those fine gents and their respective blogs).

The Reality of Hague Service: A Practitioner’s Synthesis

Lawyers tend to approach Hague Service as a form to be completed.

That instinct is understandable. The process appears straightforward: fill out a USM-94, transmit it to a Central Authority, and wait. The governing framework is stable, the forms are standardized, and the steps are widely documented.

And yet, in practice, Hague Service routinely generates delay, motion practice, and—occasionally—outright failure.

The disconnect lies in a fundamental mischaracterization. Hague Service is not an administrative task. It is a procedural act with evidentiary consequences. And like any procedural act, it must be evaluated not by how it begins, but by how it holds up when challenged.

What follows is a synthesis of that reality.

I. The First Pillar: Authority

The Hague Service Convention requires that requests originate from a “competent authority or judicial officer.” This is not surplus language.

Too often, litigators treat the USM-94 as a routing document rather than a legal instrument. But the identity and authority of the sender are not incidental—they are foundational. A request that is not properly issued risks being defective at inception, even if it is executed abroad without objection.

The practical implication is simple: Hague Service is not merely about getting documents delivered. It is about ensuring that the request itself is grounded in proper legal authority from the outset.

II. The Second Pillar: Method

The Convention provides multiple pathways, but they are not interchangeable.

Article 5(1)(a) (service through the receiving state’s internal law) remains the default for a reason: it produces the most defensible result. Alternative methods—whether under Article 5(1)(b) or Article 10—may be permissible, but permissibility is not the same as prudence.

The key question is not “what is allowed?” but rather:

What method will withstand scrutiny when the defendant challenges service, or when the court examines the record on default?

When framed that way, the analysis changes. Speed and cost become secondary to durability.

III. The Third Pillar: Documentation

Service is only as strong as the record that proves it.

This is where many otherwise valid methods falter. A signed receipt, a delivery confirmation, or a tracking record may demonstrate that something was delivered. They do not necessarily establish that:

  • the correct party was served,
  • the recipient was authorized to accept service, or
  • the documents were delivered in a manner consistent with applicable law.

By contrast, a certificate issued by a Central Authority or a detailed affidavit of service creates a coherent evidentiary record. It answers the questions a court will eventually ask.

The distinction is critical. Hague Service is not complete when documents are sent. It is complete when service can be proven.

IV. The Fourth Pillar: Jurisdictional Nuance

The Convention is uniform. Its application is not.

Each receiving state—and, in federal systems, each subnational unit—implements the Convention through its own procedural framework. These local rules govern how service is actually carried out.

What appears “routine” at the treaty level often becomes jurisdiction-specific in execution:

  • Different Central Authorities have different requirements and expectations.
  • Local service rules may dictate who can be served and how.
  • Language, formatting, and summary requirements vary.

Ignoring these nuances does not always result in immediate failure. More often, it results in delay, rejection, or a flawed record.

V. The Fifth Pillar: Endgame Awareness

Hague Service is rarely an end in itself. It is a step toward something else:

  • a responsive pleading,
  • a default judgment,
  • or eventual enforcement.

Each of those stages imposes its own demands on the sufficiency of service.

A method that suffices to provide notice may not suffice to support default. A record that survives initial scrutiny may not withstand collateral attack in an enforcement proceeding.

Accordingly, service decisions must be made with the endgame in mind. The question is not whether service will occur, but whether it will endure.

The Common Error: Treating Risk as Hypothetical

Many of the pitfalls described above are discounted because they do not arise in every case. Service by mail may work. A hastily prepared request may be accepted. A thin record may go unchallenged.

But this is a misreading of risk.

The problem is not that failure is common. The problem is that when failure occurs, it is costly—measured in delay, motion practice, and, in some cases, the loss of a default judgment.

Hague Service rewards those who plan for the contested case, not the cooperative one.

Conclusion

The Convention provides a framework. It does not eliminate judgment.

To approach Hague Service as a formality is to misunderstand its function. It is, instead, a procedural act that must be executed with the same care as any other step that affects jurisdiction, notice, and due process.

The practitioners who navigate it successfully are not those who move papers efficiently, but those who anticipate how those papers will be tested later.

In that sense, Hague Service is not about transmission.

It is about proof.

This publication is hosted by LexBlog, which I recommend to every single lawyer who is interested in sharing their knowledge with their clientele and prospective clientele– or really, every lawyer interested in bringing new clients to the office. It has been the absolute foundation of our reputation building over the past decade, but also enhances our ability to refer existing clients to a library of answers to their frequent questions. LexBlog has been embracing recent GenAI technologies and is trying to educate us on the publisher side about how to use it most effectively.

I got curious last week, and asked Gemini, Google’s AI system, to comment, and it did. Below the line today, everything is generated by Copilot.

I spent this week kicking the tires on a different AI engine — Microsoft’s Copilot — to test whether it could wrap its silicon head around the actual, on‑the‑ground reality of serving process abroad. Gemini had its shot. Copilot now gets a turn.

To its credit, Copilot didn’t try to explain Hague Service as a courier run or some frictionless postal miracle. It didn’t assume that judges can order foreign ministries around. And it didn’t pretend that any part of the Convention moves quickly.

So, in the spirit of the “Five Pillars” Gemini offered, here’s Copilot’s own distilled, high‑level, no‑nonsense Hague Survival Guide, drawing from a decade of my posts and a universe of litigators who call me right after they’ve already stepped on the rake.

The Copilot‑Constructed Hague Service Readiness Guide

1. Pillar One: You’re Not in Kansas (or America) Anymore

Foreign sovereignty isn’t a suggestion — it’s the central operating principle of the Hague Service Convention. Your judge’s authority stops at the border, and other countries take that boundary seriously.
If a receiving state objects to Article 10 (and many do — especially the usual suspects like Germany and China), then email, FedEx, and that “but FRCP 4 says…” argument won’t get you anywhere. [haguelawblog.com]

Timelines? Also not American. Copilot correctly surfaced what every litigator should tattoo on their desk: a 1–2 year wait in Mexico or India is not an outlier — it’s normal. [haguelawblog.com]

2. Pillar Two: Translate Like Someone’s Job Depends on It (Because It Does)

Article 5(3) gives foreign authorities the right to demand translation — and they nearly always do.
Your translation isn’t just for the defendant. It’s also for the bureaucrat or judicial officer deciding whether to reject your request because your 42‑page complaint reads like a Tolstoy novel. [haguelawblog.com]

Conciseness matters. Translators get paid by the word, and foreign authorities don’t like deciphering hyper‑verbose U.S. pleadings. [haguelawblog.com]

3. Pillar Three: Address Verification Is Not a Vibe — It’s a Duty

Copilot was quick to emphasize a theme long-time readers know as the Big Tony Rule:
If the registry says the company lives at Address X, then Address X is where the Request goes.
Not what opposing counsel said. Not what the website says. Not what your client swears they “think they remember.”
[haguelawblog.com]

Corporate registries remain the only Door #1 that reliably prevents a clever defendant from claiming they were never properly served.

4. Pillar Four: Your Timeline Is Not the Convention’s Timeline

This is where Copilot fully grasped the pain of my inbox. The most common question I get — often within weeks of transmitting a Request — is: “Any update, Aaron?”

And in 99% of cases, the answer is still: No.
Because the foreign Central Authority has not yet acted, and you don’t get status updates from most countries, ever.
[haguelawblog.com]

Courier delivery receipts don’t equal service. They only prove you successfully placed the Request into the machinery of another nation’s judicial system — and that machinery does not run on your schedule.
[haguelawblog.com]

5. Pillar Five: The Model Forms Are a Contract — Fill Them Like One

Copilot noted something many first‑timers overlook: the Hague Request, Certificate, and Summary forms aren’t mere cover sheets. They are the Request.
Sloppy forms create sloppy outcomes. Missing details create rejections. Mismatches between attachments and summaries create delays that can add months to an already glacial process.
[haguelawblog.com]

Treat the forms as binding representations to a foreign government, not administrative trivia.

Copilot’s Closing Take (And I Agree with It)

What makes Hague Service hard isn’t the treaty text — it’s the misconceptions American lawyers bring to it. Copilot summarized the entire challenge in one neat sentence:

“The Hague Service Convention isn’t slow or confusing — it’s just foreign.”

And that’s exactly the point.

Once you adjust your mental model, check your timelines, verify your address, translate everything properly, and embrace the fact that foreign authorities are not your subordinates… the Convention works extraordinarily well.

This publication is hosted by LexBlog, which I recommend to every single lawyer who is interested in sharing their knowledge with their clientele and prospective clientele– or really, every lawyer interested in bringing new clients to the office. It has been the absolute foundation of our reputation building over the past decade, but also enhances our ability to refer existing clients to a library of answers to their frequent questions. LexBlog has been embracing recent GenAI technologies and is trying to educate us on the publisher side about how to use it most effectively.

I got curious this morning, and simply asked Gemini, Google’s AI engine embedded in the Chrome browser, how it viewed this blog. What follows is the result… with Gemini’s introduction. Everything that follows below is Gemini-generated, a synopsis of stuff I’ve published here recently, including an an intro in my voice. Pretty fun stuff.

“I recently spent some time ‘talking shop’ with Gemini, one of the world’s most advanced AI models, to see if it could actually grasp the nuances of international service of process. To my surprise, it didn’t just understand the rules—it captured the ‘Aaron’s Rants’ philosophy of Notamerica perfectly. We decided to co-create a survival guide for the modern litigator. What follows is a distilled, ‘AI-assisted’ checklist and a reality check for anyone tempted to treat the Hague Convention like a simple courier task.”

The “Hague Service” Readiness Checklist

☐ 1. The “Notamerica” Reality Check

  • Accept Jurisdictional Limits: Your Judge has no authority to override foreign law. If a country (like China or Germany) objects to Article 10, you cannot “motion” your way into mail service.
  • Manage Timelines: Bracing the client for a 1-2 year wait in jurisdictions like Mexico or India is a requirement, not a suggestion.

☐ 2. The Translation “Gatekeeper” Test

  • Compliance with Article 5(3): Ensure every page is translated into the mandatory local language.
  • The Dual-Audience Rule: The translation must be accurate enough for the defendant to have due process, but also clear enough that foreign authorities won’t reject documents they don’t understand.
  • Word Count Audit: Avoid verbosity. Since translators get paid by the word, keeping your complaint concise saves your client’s budget.

☐ 3. The “Door #1” Address Verification

  • Registry Over Marketing: Never rely on a website or “what opposing counsel said.”
  • The Big Tony Rule: Check the official corporate registry. If it conflicts with an SEC filing or a website, the registry is the only “Door #1” that prevents a defendant from weaseling out of service.

☐ 4. Understanding Procedural Mechanics

  • Delivery ≠ Service: A FedEx receipt to a Central Authority is not proof of service.
  • Check Declarations: Navigate country-specific “reservations.” For example, in Gibraltar, you must have the process server instructed by a solicitor for Article 10(c) to be effective.

☐ 5. Professional Oversight

The “Timmy” Test: Stop tasking first-year associates with service abroad as if it were a simple courier task. It is a high-stakes legal strategy that requires an expert navigator to avoid “procedural landmines.”

Myth vs. Reality: The “Notamerica” Cheat Sheet

The MythThe Reality
“I’ll just FedEx the complaint; they speak English anyway.”The Gatekeeper Rule: If the Central Authority requires a translation under Article 5(3), they will reject your documents before they ever reach the defendant.
“My Judge ordered substituted service via email, so we’re good.”The Sovereignty Wall: A U.S. Judge has no power in a country that has objected to Article 10 (like China or Germany). Substituted service must still comport with the Treaty.
“Service is complete once the Central Authority signs for the package.”Delivery ≠ Service: You haven’t served the defendant; you’ve requested a government agency to do it for you. Proof only comes when they say it’s done.
“Their website says they are headquartered at this address.”The Big Tony Lesson: Websites are marketing; Registered Addresses are legal reality. Don’t get cute—serve “Door #1” to prevent a motion to quash.
“It’s just a summons; I’ll let the new associate handle it.”The Wolf Trap: Handing this to an inexperienced junior is a recipe for a “leaky vessel.” It is a specialized strategy, not an administrative errand.